Translation into English: Chapter 2 - Catalogue of Errors for Both Theories of Relativity

from the German documentation of G.O. Mueller

"On the Absolute Magnitude of the Special Theory of Relativity - A Documentary Thought Experiment on 95 Years of Criticism (1908-2003) with Proof of 3789 Critical Works" - Text Version 2.1 - June 2004 http://www.ekkehard-friebe.de/kap2.pdf

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P: Epistemology / Error No. 6

Relativity works with the known and standard approach of concluding the correctness of its premises from experimental results, without any proof that the theory provides the sole explanation

The world of relativity always works with the presumption that only the theories of Albert Einstein could explain the effects alleged by it. This presumption is already invalidated by the identical mathematical structure of Lorentz' theory and the STR (cf. Error O 1). As for the effects alleged or explained by the GTR, Errors M 6, M 7 and M 8 give verified alternative and independent explanations. For this reason, the conclusion that an observation or measurement shows the correctness of the premises of the theories of relativity is invalid.

Dingler (1955, cited according to the 1969 edition) criticizes the mistaken inference from a differential equation (for experimental measurements) to the correctness of the premises of the experiment for the following reasons: firstly, the equation incorporates interpolations and smoothing effects that by no means have empirical origins; and secondly, one would only have been justified in concluding the correctness of the premises once the proof had been furnished that the same differential equation cannot be derived from other premises. Without this evidence, the inference to the correctness the premises is "also a purely logically untenable claim, i.e. a logical error" (p. 207).

Whereas the indistinguishability between Einstein's STR and Lorentz' absolute theory (cf. Error O 1) is conceded by at least some relativists, these completely ignore the objection to the mistaken inference from experimental results to the correctness of the theory, if the sole possibility of explanation is not proven, or even in view of refutations of the theory based on already-verified alternative explanations, and, as a consequence, they avoid discussing these in their works. It would be interesting to know whether the relativists are unfamiliar with this objection, or fundamentally refuse to recognize it, or only regard it as irrelevant in the case of the STR.

Dingler, Hugo: Die Ergreifung des Wirklichen / Hugo Dingler. München: Eidos-Verl., 1955. 238 pages. - Dingler, Hugo: Die Ergreifung des Wirklichen [partial edition]: Chapters 1-4. Introduction by Kuno Lorenz and Jürgen Mittelstraß. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1969. 273 pages.